Singh2011March.pdf
The
Middle
East
is
Changing
–
Will
US
Policy?
By
Michael
Singh
To
say
that
the
Middle
East
has
reached
a
turning
point
would
be
missing
the
point.
The
Middle
East
is
hurtling
in
a
new
direction,
and
the
United
States
must
catch
up
or
be
left
behind.
The
remarkable
events
in
Tunisia,
Egypt,
Libya,
Bahrain,
and
elsewhere
have
shaken
a
regional
order
that
has
stood
relatively
undisturbed
since
1979,
and
thrown
into
disarray
US
interests
that
only
a
few
months
ago
seemed
secure.
These
events
call
into
question
Washington’s
post-­‐Cold
War
approach
to
the
Middle
East
and
demand
a
reevaluation
of
US
policy
in
the
region.
During
the
Cold
War,
Washington
supported
authoritarian
regimes
in
the
Middle
East
as
part
of
a
broader
strategy
to
defeat
the
Soviet
Union
and
global
communism.
At
stake
in
this
contest,
as
far
as
US
policymakers
were
concerned,
was
not
simply
geopolitical
preeminence,
but
the
fate
of
human
liberty.
Opposition
movements
were
frequently
seen,
rightly
or
wrongly,
as
cat’s
paws
for
Moscow,
and
the
local
depredations
of
friendly
dictators
were
excused
for
support
in
the
global
struggle.
When
the
Soviet
Union
was
defeated,
the
overarching
Cold
War
objective
had
vanished,
yet
the
US
approach
to
the
region
did
not
change.
Authoritarian
regimes
maintained
a
rough
alignment
of
interests
with
the
United
States,
while
Washington
did
little
to
address
the
deficit
of
human
and
political
rights
across
the
region.
US
policymakers
have
long
recognized
the
problems
inherent
in
this
approach.
It
places
our
interests
in
opposition
to
our
values.
Even
the
benefits
to
our
interests
are
questionable;
it
has
long
been
recognized
that
over
the
long
term
democracies
are
more
reliable
and
peaceful
allies
than
are
autocracies.
It
was
this
contradiction
that
led
Secretary
of
State
Condoleezza
Rice
to
observe,
in
2005,
that
“for
60
years
the
United
States
pursued
stability
at
the
expense
of
democracy
in
the
Middle
East—
and
we
achieved
neither.”
Yet,
with
few
exceptions,
US
policymakers
have
found
it
difficult
to
navigate
the
short-­‐term
tradeoffs
necessary
to
truly
elevate
the
promotion
of
democracy
and
human
rights
in
the
Middle
East
to
the
top
of
the
policy
agenda.
Yet,
in
failing
to
take
the
opportunity
afforded
by
the
fall
of
the
Soviet
Union
to
shift
toward
greater
support
for
political
reform
and
democratization
in
the
region,
the
United
States
planted
the
seeds
of
its
current
dilemma.
Washington’s
support
for
leaders
such
as
former
Egyptian
President
Hosni
Mubarak
and
Tunisia’s
Ben
Ali,
widely
viewed
as
harshly
repressive
by
their
citizens,
fostered
anti-­‐Americanism.
And
US
policymakers’
failure
to
build
a
broader
foundation
of
support
in
these
and
other
countries
meant
that
American
interests
in
the
region
were
placed
in
the
hands
of
individual
leaders
and
their
circles,
with
few
ardent
advocates
otherwise.
Taken
together,
these
choices
have
increased
the
chances
that
the
political
turmoil
in
the
region
will
at
least
for
a
time
set
back
US
interests.
For
this
reason,
recent
events
in
the
region
represent
not
an
intelligence
failure,
as
some
analysts
and
members
of
Congress
have
suggested,
but
a
policy
failure.
As
is
so
often
the
case
in
foreign
policy
crises,
US
policymakers
were
aware
of
the
potential
problem—
prospects
for
serious
domestic
turmoil
afflicting
authoritarian
regimes—but
they
did
not
treat
the
issue
with
urgency,
subordinating
it
instead
to
other
matters.
Such
was
the
road
that
led
to
the
Obama
administration’s
hesitation
and
inconsistency
when
faced
with
the
ouster
of
erstwhile
authoritarian
allies
in
Tunis
and
Cairo.
With
this
context
in
mind,
the
United
States
must
act
amid
the
region’s
turbulence
to
put
its
interests
on
a
more
sustainable
trajectory.
This
requires
that
Washington
devise
an
approach
that
better
accounts
for
the
risks
posed
by
persistent
authoritarianism
and
the
rampant
corruption
and
economic
maladies
that
accompany
it.
Even
with
policies
in
place
to
address
these
issues,
however,
the
turmoil
currently
gripping
the
Middle
East
may
persist
for
some
time,
and
the
affected
governments
may
be
weakened
commensurately.
As
a
result,
the
United
States
will
need
to
redouble
its
efforts
to
address
threats
to
its
interests
and
conflicts
in
the
region,
alongside
both
local
partners
and
allies
in
Europe
and
elsewhere.
US
interests
in
the
Middle
East
have
not
fundamentally
changed,
but
the
risks
to
them
may
be
greater,
and
the
path
to
advancing
them
more
tortuous
than
the
president
and
his
advisors
previously
understood.
Political
Reform
Perhaps
the
clearest
implication
of
recent
events
in
the
Middle
East
for
US
policy
is
the
need
to
place
greater
emphasis
on
political
reform
and
liberalization
in
the
region.
Pressing
for
such
reform
is
not
simply
a
moral
imperative
for
the
United
States,
and
it
is
not
charity;
rather,
it
reflects
a
recognition
that
sustainable
alliances
must
be
with
peoples,
not
just
governments.
In
democracies
this
distinction
is
moot,
but
in
autocracies
and
fragmented
societies
it
is
vital.
The
popular
uprisings
in
Tunisia,
Egypt,
Libya,
and
elsewhere
generated
significant
sympathy
among
US
officials,
but
they
also
caused
a
great
deal
of
anxiety
due
to
the
possibilities
of
violence
or
for
political
openings
for
extremist
groups.
It
is
important
to
recognize,
however,
that
the
ultimate
cause
of
such
prospects
for
instability
is
not
the
demand
for
political
reform,
but
the
prior
absence
of
such
reform.
As
Kenneth
Wollack
outlined
in
these
pages
in
December
2010,
US
and
European
democratic
assistance
is
based
on
the
premise
that
democracy
overseas
not
only
delivers
better
for
those
foreign
populations,
but
also
enhances
our
own
national
security.
Recent
events
in
the
Middle
East
underscore
that
this
logic
must
motivate
policy
not
just
over
the
long-­‐term,
but
should
also
push
political
reform
up
Washington’s
near-­‐term
foreign
policy
agenda.
This
is
not
to
say
that
each
country
requires
the
same
reforms
on
the
same
timetable;
it
is
just
as
true
now
as
it
was
prior
to
the
uprisings
in
the
region
that
each
country
faces
unique
challenges
and
will
move
at
its
own
pace.
Indeed,
the
uprisings
themselves
have
demonstrated
the
importance
of
institutional
differences
between
countries.
For
example,
in
Egypt
the
military
remained
unified
and
served
as
a
stabilizing
force,
and
perhaps
forced
the
hand
of
Hosni
Mubarak
and
his
inner
circle;
in
Libya,
however,
the
armed
forces
quickly
splintered.
These
differences
are
important
and
should
inform
US
efforts,
but
recent
events
make
clear
that
they
should
not
be
used
to
excuse
or
explain
away
the
absence
of
political
and
human
rights.
When
it
comes
to
advancing
political
reform,
there
are
three
broad
categories
of
countries
in
the
Middle
East.
For
countries
currently
undergoing
a
political
transition,
such
as
Tunisia,
Egypt,
and
Libya,
US
efforts
will
need
to
follow
two
primary
lines
of
action.
The
first
is
to
help
create
space
for
genuine
political
debate
and
deliberation.
This
means
preventing
internal
or
external
extremists
from
using
violence
or
intimidation
to
influence
outcomes,
as
addressed
in
greater
detail
below.
It
also
means
where
necessary
making
available
tools—whether
technological,
such
as
broadcast
media
or
Internet
applications,
or
traditional,
such
as
political
training
provided
by
international
NGOs—to
facilitate
political
discourse.
The
second
line
of
action
in
these
countries
should
be
the
provision
of
the
technical
and
financial
assistance
required
to
build
political
institutions,
conduct
sound
elections,
and
take
the
other
steps
required
to
carry
out
sustainable
reform.
With
respect
to
countries
which
are
neither
democratic
nor
US
allies,
such
as
Iran
and
Syria,
the
challenges
facing
Washington
are
very
different.
The
United
States
has
longstanding
conflicts
with
these
countries,
many
of
which,
like
Iran’s
pursuit
of
nuclear
weapons,
are
not
directly
affected
by
regional
uprisings.
Nevertheless,
Tehran
in
particular
has
touted
the
revolutions
as
“Islamic
awakenings”
and
as
a
repudiation
of
pro-­‐Western
leaders,
heedless
of
the
similarities
between
the
demands
of
opposition
movements
in
the
affected
countries
and
those
of
Iran’s
own
opposition.
In
addition
to
ensuring
that
Tehran
and
Damascus
do
not
move
beyond
such
rhetoric
to
actual
meddling
in
countries
such
as
Egypt
and
Tunisia,
the
United
States
should
seize
the
opportunity
to
increase
international
attention
to
human
rights
abuses
and
the
absence
of
political
freedom
in
Iran
and
Syria
by
increasing
the
prominence
of
these
issues
in
international
forums
and
diplomatic
interactions
with
Iran.
After
an
initially
anemic
response
to
the
Iranian
opposition
protests
that
erupted
in
June
2009,
Washington
has
increased
its
own
focus
on
human
rights
in
Iran,
such
as
placing
sanctions
in
February
2011
on
Iranian
officials
involved
in
repression.
The
Obama
Administration
should
seek
to
broaden
both
the
scope
of
these
efforts—including
by
targeting
Syria—and
multilateral
support
for
them.
The
most
difficult
challenge
Washington
faces
is
how
to
press
non-­‐democratic
allies
to
enact
political
reforms.
However
great
US
sympathy
for
pro-­‐democracy
activists,
Washington
will
be
loath
to
strain
its
ties
with
its
remaining
regional
allies,
who
in
turn
are
reportedly
unhappy
with
what
they
see
as
Washington’s
failure
to
support
Ben
Ali
and
Mubarak,
and
are
looking
for
signals
of
continuing
US
support.
The
case
that
the
United
States
must
make
to
these
allies
is
that
political
reform
is
in
the
interest
of
their
countries
as
well
as
themselves.
As
Secretary
of
State
Hillary
Clinton
asserted
in
a
speech
in
Doha
in
January
2011,
stability
in
Middle
Eastern
countries
requires
that
these
leaders
respond
to
“legitimate
needs
for
political
and
economic
reform.”
What
caused
the
ignominious
fall
of
Hosni
Mubarak
was
not
the
withdrawal
of
US
support—after
all,
Washington
has
been
criticized
for
being
slow
to
support
the
protesters—but
his
own
refusal
over
many
years
to
allow
a
significant
political
opening
or
respond
to
demands
for
change
from
Egyptians
or
calls
to
reform
from
Washington
such
as
the
one
delivered
by
Secretary
Rice
in
2005.
Economic
Reform
and
Corruption
While
political
reform
in
the
Middle
East
is
important,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
address
the
discontent
that
gave
rise
to
this
year’s
uprisings.
In
a
February
2011
poll
of
Egyptians
conducted
by
the
Washington
Institute
for
Near
East
Policy
and
Pechter
Middle
East
polls,
it
was
revealed
that
the
top
three
reasons
given
for
the
protests—
by
a
wide
margin—were
“poor
economic
conditions,”
“corruption,”
and
“unemployment.”
The
data
bears
out
these
concerns—according
to
the
CIA,
unemployment
was
30
percent
in
Libya
in
2004
and
15
percent
in
Bahrain
more
recently,
and
almost
certainly
higher
among
the
youth
who
formed
the
core
of
the
recent
uprisings.
In
Egypt,
one-­‐fifth
of
the
population
lived
below
the
poverty
line,
and
in
Libya
one-­‐third
was
poor.
As
Wollack
pointed
out,
economic
development
and
democratic
governance
are
intertwined;
while
critics
of
democracy
are
quick
to
point
to
the
“China
model”
or
other
related
examples
of
economic
growth
in
the
absence
of
political
reform,
there
are
far
more
cases
of
countries
in
which
political
repression
and
economic
stagnation
and
corruption
go
hand-­‐in-­‐hand.
Nevertheless,
political
reform
will
not
in
itself
solve
those
obstacles
to
economic
development;
indeed,
the
turmoil
in
countries
like
Egypt
and
Tunisia,
where
tourism
is
an
important
contributor
to
GDP,
may
initially
deepen
rather
than
alleviate
economic
challenges.
Democratization
also
does
not
automatically
address
corruption;
it
has
been
frequently
asserted,
for
example,
that
Russia’s
reversion
to
authoritarianism
was
fueled
in
part
by
perceptions
of
oligarchical
corruption
in
the
immediate
post-­‐Communist
period.
To
help
countries
in
the
region
overcome
these
economic
challenges,
the
United
States
should
consider
a
number
of
steps.
These
include,
but
are
not
limited
to,
the
provision
of
macroeconomic
advice
and
technical
assistance,
lowering
or
removing
barriers
to
trade
and
investment,
broadening
usage
of
anti-­‐kleptocracy
sanctions,
and
urging
oil-­‐rich
states
to
invest
more
in
their
poorer
neighbors
to
reinforce
the
economic
fabric
of
the
region.
In
addition,
the
United
States
should
review
its
approach
to
economic
aid
to
these
countries
to
ensure
that
assistance
does
not
foster
dependency
but
instead
encourages
entrepreneurship
and
local
economic
growth.
In
recent
years
the
United
States
has
retooled
its
approach
to
economic
aid
via
such
vehicles
as
the
Millennium
Challenge
Corporation,
which
vets
potential
recipients
according
to
a
strict
set
of
criteria
in
order
to
encourage
local
reform
and
build
indigenous
skills
and
capabilities.
Threats
and
Conflicts
While
a
greater
emphasis
on
smart
political
and
economic
reforms
is
essential
to
put
US
interests
in
the
Middle
East
on
a
secure
footing,
the
implications
of
the
recent
uprisings
in
the
region
are
much
broader.
In
the
immediate
term,
the
situations
in
Egypt,
Libya,
Tunisia
and
elsewhere
are
far
from
settled,
and
could
just
as
easily
descend
into
chaos
or
revert
to
authoritarianism
as
progress
toward
democracy
remains
elusive.
In
the
longer
term,
US
military
planners
and
intelligence
analysts
will
need
to
revisit
their
assumptions
and
judgments,
which
will
have
implications
for
the
US
posture
in
the
region
for
years
to
come.
To
grapple
with
these
new
challenges
as
well
as
longstanding
threats,
Washington
will
need
to
strengthen
its
partnerships
with
remaining
allies.
Contrary
to
conventional
wisdom,
bolstering
our
alliances
and
pushing
for
reform
are
not
mutually
exclusive.
A
firm
commitment
to
allies’
security
and
prosperity
cements
the
trust
necessary
to
effectively
advocate
for
reform,
and
allays
suspicions
that
the
United
States
is
acting
imprudently.
Indeed,
the
US
alliances
with
Israel,
the
Palestinian
Authority
(PA),
and
some
Arab
states
were
strained
even
prior
to
the
revolutions
in
Tunisia
and
Egypt
not
over
the
question
of
reform,
but
due
to
what
our
allies
saw
as
poor
approaches
to
regional
issues
such
as
the
Middle
East
peace
process
and
Iran.
The
challenge
is
different
and
perhaps
more
complex
in
countries
undergoing
transition,
where
the
United
States
must
rebuild
relationships
with
individuals
who
may
be
skeptical
of
the
benefits
of
cooperation
with
the
West.
Together
with
allies
old
and
new,
the
United
States
will
need
to
confront
several
challenges,
including
the
three
detailed
below.
First,
the
transitions
in
Tunisia,
Egypt,
and
Libya,
and
the
unrest
in
the
region
more
broadly,
will
provide
openings
that
extremist
groups
will
be
eager
to
exploit.
Much
has
been
made,
for
example,
of
the
possibility
that
the
Muslim
Brotherhood
will
gain
from
a
transition
to
democracy
in
Egypt.
The
extremist
threat
has
two
aspects,
each
of
which
demands
a
different
response.
The
first
is
the
possibility
that
extremist
groups,
alone
or
in
conjunction
with
state
sponsors
of
terrorism
such
as
Iran,
will
seek
to
exploit
the
weakened
condition
of
states
in
the
region
to
foment
chaos
and
violence
and
subvert
movement
toward
participatory
government
in
places
like
Tunisia
and
Egypt.
The
historical
examples
are
bracing—the
Bolsheviks
in
revolutionary
Russia,
partisans
of
Ayatollah
Khomeini
in
Iran
in
1979
and
thereafter,
or
Hamas’
forcible
takeover
of
government
in
Gaza
following
its
electoral
victory
in
2006.
Addressing
this
threat
requires
that
the
United
States
redouble
its
vigilance
in
the
region
to
monitor
and
counter
terrorist
groups
and
their
supporters,
all
while
enjoying
a
likely
degraded
level
of
counterterrorism
cooperation
from
Egypt,
Libya,
and
Tunisia.
The
second
challenge
posed
by
extremist
groups
is
that,
by
virtue
of
their
size,
resources,
and
organizational
strengths
relative
to
secular
competitors,
they
will
command
a
role
in
government
that
may
exceed
their
true
level
of
popular
support.
This
fear
is
particularly
acute
in
Egypt.
According
to
the
Washington
Institute/Pechter
poll,
the
Muslim
Brotherhood’s
“approval”
rating
is
just
15
percent
in
Egypt,
and
its
leader
receives
just
1
percent
support
in
a
presidential
straw
poll.
Nevertheless,
the
group
captured
20
percent
of
seats
in
Egypt’s
parliament
in
2005,
and
its
leaders
have
estimated
that
it
would
enjoy
30
percent
support
in
a
free
election.
To
counter
the
possibility
that
the
Muslim
Brotherhood
or
similar
groups
will
command
disproportionate
representation
in
government,
the
international
community
can
aid
in
the
development
and
training
of
secular
alternatives,
and
advise
Egypt’s
transitional
authorities
on
designing
a
constituency-­‐based
electoral
system
that
favors
accountability
over
ideology.
Events
in
the
region
will
also
have
implications
for
Israel
and
the
Palestinians.
Israel
views
the
upheavals
across
the
region,
especially
the
revolution
in
Egypt,
as
potentially
seriously
threatening
its
security.
Although
Israel
enjoyed
neither
peace
with
nor
even
recognition
from
many
of
its
neighbors,
it
had
nevertheless
settled
into
a
relatively
stable
relationship
with
them
far
preferable
to
the
period
of
intermittent
war
between
1948
and
1973.
Egypt’s
revolution
not
only
calls
into
question
the
future
status
of
the
peace
treaty
and
political
relations
between
Israel
and
Egypt,
but
the
security
of
Israel’s
southwestern
border
and
the
flow
of
arms
to
Hamas
in
Gaza.
This
is
not
merely
a
concern
about
the
Muslim
Brotherhood;
secular
politicians
such
as
Ayman
Nour
have
also
called
for
reevaluating
the
Camp
David
Accords.
Israel
also
worries
about
its
foes
in
the
region
being
emboldened
by
the
fall
of
Hosni
Mubarak,
who
was
reliably
committed
to
peace
with
Israel.
That
Iran
and
its
allies
see
this
as
a
moment
to
act
boldly
was
underscored
by
the
passage
of
two
Iranian
ships
through
the
Suez
Canal
on
February
22,
the
first
such
transit
by
Iranian
vessels
since
1979.
As
serious
as
the
pressure
on
Israel
resulting
from
recent
events
may
be,
the
pressure
on
the
Palestinian
Authority
may
be
more
severe.
Like
Israel,
the
PA
is
negatively
affected
by
the
fall
of
Hosni
Mubarak,
who
was
a
staunch
supporter
of
the
PA
against
Hamas,
far
more
so
than
many
other
Arab
leaders.
Unlike
Israel,
however,
the
PA
may
also
be
subject
to
internal
pressure
from
its
own
people,
and
find
itself
in
the
unenviable
position
of
having
to
engage
in
domestic
reform
at
a
time
of
reduced
regional
support.
To
address
the
increased
insecurity
of
both
Israel
and
the
PA,
the
United
States
will
need
to
step
up
its
support
to
both.
In
the
case
of
Israel,
this
means
not
simply
military
assistance,
an
area
in
which
the
bilateral
relationship
is
healthy,
but
also
political
support,
which
has
frayed
of
late.
In
the
case
of
the
Palestinians,
this
means
both
the
sort
of
financial
and
security
assistance
currently
provided
by
the
US
and
others,
as
well
as
diplomatic
backing
to
maintain
or
increase
the
political
and
other
support
from
the
region
upon
which
the
PA
depends.
Securing
such
support
may
be
more
difficult
for
American
diplomats
in
the
current
regional
context,
but
it
is
also
more
necessary
than
ever.
Given
the
loss
of
an
ally
in
Egypt,
and
the
pressure
being
placed
on
other
friendly
rulers
such
as
King
Abdullah
of
Jordan,
both
Israel
and
the
PA
should
also
reevaluate
their
current
approach
to
the
Israeli-­‐Palestinian
peace
process.
While
now
is
hardly
a
propitious
moment
for
progress
on
that
front
for
many
reasons,
the
recent
changes
in
the
region
underscore
that
neither
side
can
count
on
indefinite
regional
support
for
a
two-­‐state
solution.
New
governments
in
Cairo
and
Tunis
may
or
may
not
support
initiatives
like
the
Saudi
Peace
Initiative
of
2002,
which
was
far
from
perfect
but,
most
importantly,
held
out
the
prospect
of
Arab
normalization
with
Israel.
And
if
Islamist
parties
gain
increased
sway,
those
governments
may
not
even
support
Palestinian
negotiations,
preferring
instead
the
path
of
violent
“resistance”
offered
by
Hamas
and
already
endorsed
by
Iran,
Syria,
Turkey,
and
others.
Both
Israel
and
the
PA
should
look
to
take
advantage
of
what
may
be
a
shrinking
window
of
regional
support
for
their
efforts.
Finally,
as
a
result
of
the
recent
uprisings
and
other
events,
the
United
States
will
need
to
deal
with
an
increasingly
confident
(perhaps
overconfident)
Iranian
regime.
As
previously
noted,
Tehran
sees
the
revolutions
across
the
region
as
working
in
its
favor,
and
has
thus
acted
boldly.
Even
before
these
events,
however,
the
Iranian
regime
believed
events
in
the
region
were
going
its
way
due
to
Hezbollah’s
ascendancy
in
Lebanon,
the
apparent
recovery
of
Iran’s
uranium
enrichment
program,
and
rising
oil
prices,
among
other
developments.
When
the
Iranian
regime
feels
emboldened,
it
has
a
tendency
to
engage
in
provocative
behavior,
as
its
ships’
Suez
transit
demonstrates.
To
prevent
Tehran
from
escalating
this
behavior
or
seeking
to
influence
the
direction
of
political
transitions
across
the
region,
the
United
States
should
not
lose
sight
of
the
need
to
continually
deal
new
blows
to
the
Iranian
regime
in
the
form
of
sanctions
or
other
forms
of
pressure.
Diplomatic
bandwidth
is
not
an
infinite
resource,
but
some
must
be
found
even
amid
efforts
to
deal
with
turmoil
elsewhere
in
the
region
to
curtail
Iran’s
enthusiasm
for
troublemaking.
Given
the
failure
of
the
P5+1
(the
five
permanent
members
of
the
UN
Security
Council
–
the
US,
UK,
France,
Russia
and
China
–
plus
Germany)
to
make
progress
in
the
latest
round
of
nuclear
negotiations
with
Iran
in
Istanbul,
the
West
has
been
focused
in
any
event
on
devising
new
means
to
pressure
Tehran.
The
recent
wave
of
political
turmoil
that
has
swept
across
the
Middle
East
has
presented
the
United
States
with
a
host
of
challenges
and
demands
that
US
policy
in
the
region
be
reevaluated.
However,
the
uprisings
have
also
swept
away
the
outdated
notions
that
people
in
the
Middle
East
do
not
want
or
are
not
ready
for
democracy.
That
these
revolutions
will
result
in
democracy,
or
even
that
they
will
represent
a
net
gain
for
their
authors
or
for
US
interests,
is
far
from
inevitable.
However,
it
can
no
longer
be
called
into
question
that
populations
in
the
Middle
East
value
and
desire
the
same
liberties
that
their
counterparts
in
the
West
have
long
enjoyed.
Those
shared
values,
so
frequently
called
into
question,
hold
out
the
prospect
for
a
renewed,
revitalized,
and
enduring
relationship
between
the
people
of
the
United
States
and
the
people
of
the
Middle
East.